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Abstract 
This thesis investigates how CEO risk taking incentives related to compensation in the 
form of executive stock options affect the decision to engage in merger and acquisition 
(M&A) activities with particular attention to same-industry versus cross-industry 
acquisitions. Risk taking incentives increase the propensity of M&As, especially for same-
industry M&As. Furthermore, risk taking incentives increase the likelihood of cash 
payment for both same and cross-industry acquisitions. We do not find a significant direct 
stock price response difference between same-industry and cross-industry acquiring firms. 
The market responds favorably when risk taking incentives are higher for both same-
industry acquisitions and cross-industry takeovers. We further find that the acquiring firm’s 
post-acquisition cash flow volatility is also positively related to risk taking incentives for 
both same- and cross-industry M&As. 
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1. Introduction 
Previous literature has documented how option-based compensation aligns managerial 
interests with those of shareholders, and thus induces managers to accept projects that 
increase their firm’s value. Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Smith and Stulz (1985) posit 
that compensation associated with stock price performance is effective in relieving a 
manager’s tendency to risk-aversion and encouraging him to invest in risky but positive 
net present value projects. This finding is related to the widespread use of executive stock 
options that are intended to link the compensation of CEOs with the interests of 
shareholders and thereby reduce agency problems. Conversely, Lambert et al. (1991) states 
that stock options do not necessarily encourage managerial risk-seeking behavior. 
Yermack (1995) and Cohen et al. (2000) further find that stock options may not reduce the 
agency conflicts since these options not only have an asymmetric payoff, but also do not 
usually pay dividends. In summary, previous theories highlight controversial predictions 
about the effects of incentive compensation on a CEO’s risk-seeking behavior.  
Executive compensation, specifically option-based compensation, does affect 
M&As (Croci and Petmezas, 2015) and this effect leads to the question: How do CEO risk 
taking incentives affect M&A activities? In theory a risk averse CEO’s expected utility 
increases from an increase in wealth, but decreases from an increase in risk. Since the CEO 
possesses firm-specific human capital, he is less able to diversify firm specific risk than 
the firm’s shareholders who have a well-diversified portfolio. The CEO would use a larger 
cost of capital than the firm’s shareholders to evaluate risky projects, and he may reject 
risky projects even if such projects would have created value for shareholders. It is possible 
for a project to create value for the firm, while simultaneously decreasing the level of a 
CEO’s utility. 
We extend the literature by examining the relation between CEO risk taking 
incentives and M&A activities with particular attention to the differences between same-
industry and cross-industry acquisitions. We expect risk taking incentives to affect M&As 
for the following reasons. First, M&As are risky investments as they have uncertain net 
present values. Second, CEOs’ risk taking incentives can cause them to affect firm’s long-
term investment policies (Datta et al., 2001). M&As are one of the most important 
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corporate investment decisions, so a CEO’s incentives should affect M&A activities. Third, 
M&As are risky investments for CEOs in particular because CEOs might be fired after 
M&As (Lehn and Zhao, 2006). Due to the existence of diversification effect, M&As might 
be optimal choices even though synergies are not positive (Thijssen, 2008). We especially 
test the effects of risk taking incentives on M&As with same-industry takeovers and cross-
industry takeovers.  
We construct two proxies for managerial compensation incentives: Vega is the 
change in the value of a CEO’s wealth for a 0.01 change in annualized stock return 
volatility, and Delta is the change in the value of a CEO’s wealth for a 1% change in 
annualized stock return. Using a sample of 23,667 firm-year observations between 1992 
and 2013 we find that higher Vega is associated with a higher probability of taking over 
and if they proceed with the takeover, higher Vega is associated with a higher probability 
of same-industry takeovers. We also find that higher Vega is associated with higher 
likelihood of cash payment in M&As for both same-industry and cross-industry takeovers. 
We further investigate the stock market reaction of the acquiring firm after an acquisition 
and we find that a higher Vega is associated with a positive short-term cumulative abnormal 
return (CAR) for both cross-industry and same-industry takeovers. In other words, risk 
taking incentives help firms choose better than average cross-industry deals and same-
industry deals based on the short term stock market response. We also find that higher Vega 
is positively correlated with higher post-M&A cash flow volatility for both same- and 
cross-industry takeovers. 
Our study contributes to the literature on the following perspectives. First, our 
research provides empirical evidence in justifying the positive relation between risk taking 
incentives and a CEO’s willingness to assume more risk. Adding both Vega and Delta into 
our empirical study allows us to isolate the effect of one and the other in testing the effects 
of risk taking incentives. Second, consistent with previous literature and the latest study of 
Croci and Petmezas (2015) our study sheds new light on the relation between risk taking 
incentives and the acquiring firm’s intent in takeovers. The difference between our research 
and the study from Croci and Petmezas (2015) is that we control for the same-industry and 
cross-industry to test whether diversification matters in M&As. We further test the effects 
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of risk taking incentives on the short-term stock performance and post-M&A cash flow 
volatility by distinguishing between same- and cross-industry takeovers. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews previous literature 
and develops hypotheses; Section 3 presents data and methodology; Section 4 discusses 
empirical results of research; Section 5 concludes that managerial incentives do affect 
mergers and acquisitions.  
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2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Literature Review 
2.1.1 CEO risk taking incentives and M&A decisions 
Risk taking incentives of CEOs influence firm’s investing and financing decisions through 
linking CEO’s personal wealth with both company risk and performance (Guay, 1999; 
Rogers, 2002; Denis and Mihov, 2003; Coles et al., 2006; Croci and Petmezas, 2015). 
Coles et al. (2006) advance the influence of executive stock options and show that CEOs 
can increase firm risk by applying riskier financial policy such as leveraging. Their 
empirical results document a positive relation between option-based compensation and the 
riskiness of financial policies. Their findings also include that higher Vega leads to lower 
investment in capital expenditures and higher stock return volatility. Latest paper (Croci 
and Petmezas, 2015) argues that risk-taking incentives do induce CEOs to carry out 
investments decisions and invest more in M&As.  
The classic literature has well documented the risk-averse effect and the wealth 
effect of executive stock options on managerial incentives. On one hand, stock options will 
increase in value as stock return volatility increases and therefore, an increase in the 
convexity of the CEO’s payoff by increasing the sensitivity of CEO wealth to firm risk 
would encourage CEOs to take more risk (Hall and Liebman, 1997; Hirshleifer and Suh, 
1992). On the other hand, granting more options does not necessarily lead a manager to 
seeking greater risk (Carpenter, 2000). Due to a substantial increase of the sensitivity of 
CEO wealth to stock return (Hall and Liebman, 1997; Jensen and Murphy, 1990),1 CEOs 
are discouraged to assume further risk (Smith and Stulz, 1985)). A drop in stock price 
might have a larger impact on the value of CEO's personal wealth than the increase of the 
volatility that increases CEO's personal wealth. Whether risk taking incentives motivate 
CEOs to bear more risk is still theoretically and empirically controversial. 
For cross-industry M&As, diversification drives executives to pursue M&As, 
hence increasing their personal incentives (Amihud and Lev, 1981). In other words, M&As 
might be optimal choices even though synergies are not positive (Thijssen, 2008). 
                                                          
1 The sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock return is defined as Delta.  
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Therefore, M&As do not just necessarily result in efficiency gains and diversification is a 
strong determinant in M&A decisions. 
Why do we use M&As? First, M&A is viewed as a risky investment in regards to 
the uncertainty of cash flow. Second, M&A exposes CEOs to risks because CEOs’ personal 
employment relationship with the firm may terminate (Lehn and Zhao, 2006).  
Why we use CEO’s risk taking incentives? First of all, CEOs are likely to hold the 
decision-making authority in M&As, especially when CEO's pay is titled to incentive 
compensation (Graham et al., 2011). Second, managers behave consistently in their 
personal and professional lives and CEOs’ personal behavior can partially explain 
corporate financial behavior of the firms they manage (Cronqvist et al., 2012).  
2.1.2 CEO risk taking incentives and method of payment in M&As 
CEOs’ risk taking incentives play a significant role in determining the method of payment 
in M&As (Martynova and Renneboog, 2009; Faccio and Masulis, 2005). Signaling 
hypothesis bases on the assumption that managers have inside information regarding the 
true value of the firm compared with target and shareholders. Specifically, asymmetric 
information between the bidder and the target on the value of the bidder shares allows the 
bidder to offer shares if these shares are overvalued and to offer cash if they are 
undervalued. Ismail and Krause (2010) empirically investigate the determinants of the 
payment form in M&As. They document, however, that asymmetric information is not an 
economically important determinant. Martynova and Renneboog (2009) focus on the 
methods of payment and assume that all-cash offers are entirely financed with internally 
generated funds and investigate the bidder's choice of the sources of financing in European 
corporate takeovers. They find that the financing decision is explained by pecking order 
preferences and the corporate governance environment, but not the agency conflicts 
between managers and shareholders, or between shareholders and creditors.  
Why do we test the relationship between Vega and percent of cash offered in M&As? 
First, prior M&A study provides evidence that cash-paid M&As are mostly financed by 
debt (Faccio and Masulis, 2005). Hence, cash payment in M&As will increase a firm’s 
leverage and therefore increase a firm’s risk. Second, excess cash balances mitigate the 
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risk to bondholders from risk-taking incentives induced by high Vega compensation (Liu 
and Mauer, 2011).  
2.1.3 CEO risk taking incentives and post-M&A stock returns 
Executive compensation plans, especially plans with stock options that held managers, are 
generally linking managements’ personal wealth with that of shareholders (Cougulan and 
Schmidt, 1985; Myers and Majluf, 1984; Cornett and De, 1991; Datta et al., 2001; 
Martynova and Renneboog 2009; Croci and Petmezas, 2015). Cougulan and Schmidt 
(1985) find that executive compensation plans are effective in aligning the incentives of 
management to shareholders. To increase CEO’s personal wealth, they would carry out 
positive net-present-value projects to increase firm’s value and therefore increase the stock 
performance of the firm. Myers and Majluf (1984) further posit that different methods of 
payment in M&As, key reflections of asymmetric information, lead to different stock 
returns of bidders in mergers and tender offers. Stockholders of both acquiring and target 
firms obtain higher returns when a takeover is financed with cash while acquiring and 
target firms will get capital loss in equity offers (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003). Datta et al. 
(2001) document a strong positive relation between executive stock options received by 
acquiring managers and stock price response around and following corporate acquisition 
announcements. Martynova and Renneboog (2009) show that acquisitions financed with 
internally generated funds underperform debt-financed deals, suggesting that investors 
assume that cash-financed deals may be driven by managerial empire building motives. 
Latest empirical paper (Croci and Petmezas, 2015) documents a positive relation between 
risk taking incentives and bidder announcement return. On contrary, Cornett and De (1991) 
argue that the abnormal announcement period returns of cash offer and equity offers are 
not significantly different from each other. Similar findings are also documented in Yang 
et al. (2009) that cash offer acquirers and stock offer acquirers do not produce significantly 
different abnormal returns on equity for hospitality acquirers.  
Theoretical papers (Travlos, 1987; Abowd, 1990; Travlos and Papaioannou, 1991) 
have compared the firm’s post-M&A performance between cash-offer and stock-offer. 
Travlos (1987) posits that different method of payment in M&As are correlated with 
different stock returns of acquiring firms. They find that stockholders experience 
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significant losses at the announcement of the takeover proposal if acquiring firms fully pay 
stocks to finance. However, firms who pay cash in the M&A do not experience significant 
abnormal returns of stock. In other word, their stock returns fall in normal range. Their 
findings are consistent with the signaling theory that financing the takeover through stocks 
is negatively viewed by the market in that it conveys the information that the firm is 
overvalued. Using two models (discrete formulation and continuous formulation), Abowd 
(1990) examines the relationship between the sensitivity of managerial compensation and 
the following year’s corporate performance and his findings indicate that shareholders 
would be benefited from increasing the performance-pay parts in the whole managerial 
compensation. Travlos and Papaioannou (1991) further explore the signaling models of 
Myers and Majluf (1984) in examining the effects of both the method of payment and the 
capital structure changes on the common stock returns for acquiring firms. They find that 
when firms’ capital structure is stable, cash offers experience significantly higher abnormal 
returns than stock offers do. They also indicate that both abnormal returns of cash offers 
and of stock offers are not affected by the market participants’ understanding of the capital 
change of the firms. 
2.1.4 CEO risk taking incentives and post-M&A cash flow volatility 
Previous literature documents the role of cash flow volatility in M&As. Froot et al. (1993) 
claim that firms may want to hedge cash flow volatility and therefore, the CEOs of those 
firms are using M&As as a method of risk management. Penas and Unal (2004) further 
justify that the primary determinants of merger-related bondholder gains are diversification 
gains and mergers are used as an operational hedge of cash flow volatility. Garfinkel and 
Hankins (2011) also support the risk management view and use empirical results to prove 
that risk management plays an important role in M&As at the firm and industry levels. 
They document that these firms experience cash flow volatility reduction after same-
industry M&As. 
2.2 Hypothesis Development 
As we discuss in Section 2.1, higher Vega motivates CEOs to increase firm’s risk and 
therefore increase their personal wealth. We test the effect of Vega on firm’s likelihood to 
takeover. Amihud and Lev (1981) posit that diversification of cross-industry takeover 
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drives executives to pursue M&As, hence increasing their personal incentives. This view 
is further justified by Thijssen (2008) who uses updated model to prove that M&As might 
be optimal choices even though synergies are not positive. In other words, M&As do not 
necessarily result in efficiency gains, but diversification is a stronger determinant in M&A 
decisions. We use these literature review to justify the following testable hypotheses.  
Hypothesis 1: Firms are more likely to carry out same-industry takeovers and are 
less likely to carry out cross-industry takeovers as CEO Vega increases.  
Armstrong and Vashishtha (2012) argue that higher Vega gives CEOs motivations 
to increase firms’ total risk. Croci and Petmezas (2015) find a positive correlation between 
Vega and acquisition. As we discussed in the literature review, existing literature suggests 
that risk taking incentives should be positively associated with risky firm policies. However, 
cross-industry takeovers provide diversification for acquiring firms. Therefore, we posit 
the above hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 2: Firms are more willing to pay cash in M&As as CEO Vega increases. 
Cash offers are generally riskier offers,2 higher Vega motivates CEOs to increase 
firms’ risk. Consistent with the first hypothesis and previous literature that argue higher 
CEO Vega will persuade managers to take on greater risk, our second hypothesis regarding 
the relation between CEO’s Vega and the cash payment will be as above. 
Hypothesis 3: For cross-industry M&A, firm’s post-M&A CAR is positively 
correlated with Vega. For same-industry M&A, firm’s post-M&A CAR is negatively 
correlated with Vega. 
Whether executive compensation plans are effective in aligning the incentives of 
management to shareholders is still in question. To increase a CEO’s personal wealth, he 
would increase the stock performance of the firm. Hence firms should experience positive 
cumulative abnormal returns after M&As. This relation is well documented in Croci and 
Petmezas (2015). However, Loomis (1982) claims that there is no link between 
management compensation and measures of stock price performance. His study finds no 
relations between management compensation and the stock performance afterwards. 
                                                          
2 Reasons are provided in the literature review section 2.1.2.  
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Amihud and Lev (1981) find that diversification drives executives to pursue M&As, hence 
increasing their personal incentives. 
Our hypothesis is based on the previous two hypotheses. If CEOs with higher Vega 
are more commonly to take over other firms and are more likely to use cash to finance the 
take-over, market might react to CEO’s decision negatively because of the over-optimal 
risk firms will bear. However, due to the diversification effect of cross-industry takeover, 
market might react to cross-industry takeover positively. Hence, we posit the above 
hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 4: Firms will experience positive post-M&A cash flow volatility as CEO 
Vega increases.  
Higher risk taking incentives may encourage CEOs to assume excessive risk. For 
firms with higher Vega and higher cash reserves, they may be more likely to pay cash in 
M&As. For firms with higher Vega and without enough cash holdings, they may be more 
willing to issue more debt. Either way will increase firm’s cash flow volatility after M&A. 
Garfinkel and Hankins (2011) supports the risk management view that firm’s operation is 
related to cash flow volatility in a risk-managing perspective. Based on previous literature 
and hypotheses, we posit our fourth hypothesis as above.  
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3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data and sample 
The initial sample covers the period from 1992 to 2013.3 We collected accounting data 
from Compustat, CEO compensation data from Execucomp, daily stock price from CRSP, 
and Merger and Acquisition data from SDC. We merged data from these source to form 
our initial sample and took several steps to clean the primary sample to our Base Sample. 
First, Consistent with previous studies we excluded financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) and 
utility firms (SIC 4900-4999). Second, we excluded specific firm-year observations from 
our sample if the firm misses such critical variables as total asset, sales, Vega, or, Delta. 
We further excluded firm-year observations with negative equity. Third, we replace 
missing values of capital expenditures with zero. Our base sample has 23,667 firm-year 
observations. All the observations of the base sample are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles to eliminate outliers. Table 2 presents the description of the sample. 
Testing hypothesis 2 calls for a sample consisting firms that have successfully 
completed a takeover. We took further steps to construct our hypothesis 2 sample by 
ensuring that: 
1. Essential information, including transaction dates, types, sic, etc. is 
not missing. 
2. The transaction value is over 1 million dollars and we keep the 
largest takeover of the year for analysis.  
3. The acquisition is either a majority stake purchase (no less than 50 
percent) or a 100 acquisition of the target firm.  
4. Cash payment is defined as 100% cash offered in the M&A deal.4 
The resulting sample contains 3,893 firm-year observations. All the observations 
are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to eliminate outliers. Testing Hypothesis 3 
                                                          
3 Exeucomp modified the reporting format in 2006. Calculation method is revised after 2006.  
4 We only consider cash and stock offered as payment in take-over due to the availability of data. Other 
payment methods, labeled as unknown or other in SDC, are not considered in this paper.  
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requires the availability of CAR and testing hypothesis 4 requires the availability of cash 
flow volatility. After meeting with the above requirements, the sample size shrinks to 3,018 
and 2,071 respectively.  
3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 Vega and M&A decisions 
As literature suggests, Vega possesses important significance in determining the 
willingness of CEO to take risks and thus impacts the likelihood of firms to take over 
potential targets. To directly test the effects of Vega on the likelihood of taking over, we 
adopt the sequential logit model as follows:  
Non-takeover means firms with no takeovers over $1 million in value in certain 
year. Takeover within same industry means at least one takeover took place, the largest of 
which has a target in the same industry as measured by two-digit SIC.5 Takeover within 
different industry means at least one takeover took place, the largest of which has a target 
in a different industry as measured by two-digit SIC.  
P t+1 (x,i) is the probability that observation i has outcome of x. 
𝑃𝑡 + 1(𝑥, 𝑖)/(1 −  𝑃𝑡 + 1(𝑥, 𝑖))  = 𝑎 + 𝛽1,𝑥 ∗ 𝑉𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡 + 𝛽𝑚,𝑥 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡 (1) 
X = 0 for non-takeover firms;  
X = 1 for firm that take over within the same industry; 
X = 2 for firm that take over within different industries.  
Consider the following scenarios of firms’ takeover decisions. It consists of two 
transitions: First a firm decides whether it takes over another firm or not, than given that it 
carries out the takeover decision the firm decides whether it takes over the target that 
operates within the same industry or within a different industry. The first transition 
                                                          
5 For robustness, we identify takeovers within the same industry as takeovers for which firm only one deal 
over $1 million takes place and the target is from the same industry as the bidding firm as measured by two-
digit SIC. Takeover within different industry is defined as takeovers of which firm only one deal over $1 
million takes place and the target is from a different industry as the bidding firm as measured by two-digit 
SIC. 
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compares X = 0 and X = 1 or X = 2; the second transition compares X = 1 and X = 2.  
We link CEOs’ willingness to take risks with likelihood of taking over for the 
following reasons. First, M&As are risky investments in regards to uncertain net present 
value.6 Second, consistent with Datta et al. (2001), CEO’s risk taking incentives impact 
firm’s long-term investment policies. M&As are considered important corporate 
investment decisions. Hence it is reasonable to conclude that risk taking incentives 
influence the firm’s M&A decisions.  
Our main independent variable is Vegat, which measures the change in the value of 
CEO wealth for a 0.01 change in annualized stock return volatility in year t. We use Vega 
in previous year because it is known by the CEO ahead of time, and it mitigates reverse 
causality with the CEO compensation potentially decided post-merger. According to our 
hypothesis 1, we expect a positive sign of the coefficient for Vegat for same-industry 
takeover and a negative sign of coefficient for Vegat for cross-industry takeover.  
To investigate how Vega affects the CEO’s willingness to take risks, it is of great 
importance to control the other factors that may impact M&As. Consistent with our main 
independent variable, we choose Controlst in year t. We first control firm size (SIZE) 
because Benson et al. (2014) suggests that for smaller firms equity risks are generally 
higher.7 8 Therefore, CEOs will consider firm size when they make take-over decisions on 
whether or not to take more risks. We would expect a positive sign of the coefficient of 
firm size.  
An acquiring firm with higher leverage would be more careful in making take-over 
decisions because they would have to pay back the debt at certain point and thus may affect 
the capability to raise more capital (Faccio and Masulis, 2005). Hence we also control for 
firm’s LEVERAGE and we would expect a negative sign of its coefficient. 
A firm spending more on capital expenditures will reduce the need and funds 
                                                          
6 As Croci and Petmezas (2015) argue, regardless of whether all acquisitions increase firm’s risk or not, 
acquisitions expose a certain degree of risk to CEO.  
7 We have also used LOG_SALES as a proxy of the firm size and the findings still hold in robustness tests.  
8 In robustness test, we replace SIZE with LOG_SALES and the results are still consistent. 
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available for an M&A. Therefore, CAP is used as another control variable and we would 
expect a negative sign of its coefficient. 
BM ratio is used to proxy for firm’s valuation. Firms with more likely to invest in 
M&As when their stocks are overvalued (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003). We proxy for growth 
opportunities using SALE_GROWTH, and ROA. One explanation is that firms with higher 
sales growth are more likely to have higher cash reserve and hence, they are more likely to 
invest in M&As. We would expect a positive sign of the coefficient of sales growth and 
ROA, but a negative sign of that of BM.  
Eventually we also control for both year and industry effects. We also control on 
Delta and reports the results in related tables.  
3.2.2 Vega and cash payment 
To test the association between likelihood of cash payment and the CEO risk taking 
incentives, we adopt the following logit model:  
Logit (Pcash t + 1 / (1 −  Pcash t + 1))
= 𝑎 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑉𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝛽3
∗ 𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 ∗ 𝑉𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡 
 
(2) 
Pcash is defined as the possibility of firm paying 100% cash in M&As. We use 100% 
cash payment in M&As for the following two reasons. First, cash reserves are important 
for the firms as cash is safer than other assets. Therefore, paying cash would decrease the 
holdings of safe assets of the firms and hence would imply the risk-seeking of CEO. Second, 
cash offers and stocks offers are two important offers in takeovers. The risk of the takeover 
would be largely shared by the bidders and targets if the bidder pays in stocks. However, 
bidders who pay cash are generally acquiring firms that seek risks. To test the difference 
between same- and cross-industry takeovers, we include Same_Industry that takes 1 for 
firms that carried out M&As within the same-industry and takes 0 otherwise. We include 
another interactive term Same_Industry*Vegat to test different effects of Vega on 
likelihood of takeover in M&As. Consistent with hypothesis 1 and previous literature, our 
main independent variable is Vegat. We use lagged compensation incentives because they 
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are influencing the following year’s risk taking behaviors and policies’ riskiness. Based on 
our hypothesis 2, we expect a positive sign of the coefficient for Vegat for both same-
industry takeover and cross-industry takeover. Acquiring firms paying more cash assume 
more risk as cash payment does not provide risk-sharing benefits for them.  
We further control other factors that may impact M&As. Consistent with our main 
independent variable, we choose Controlst in year t. 
We first control firm size (SIZE) because Benson et al. (2014) suggests that for 
smaller firms equity risks are generally higher. Therefore CEOs will consider firm size 
when they make take-over decisions on whether or not take more risks. We would expect 
a negative sign of the coefficient of firm size.  
An acquiring firm with more growth opportunities is more likely to pay the offer in 
shares instead of cash, because it prefers to reserve the cash to finance other investment 
opportunities required for growth (Swieringa and Schauten, 2007). Therefore, 
SALES_GROWTH is used as a control variable and we would expect a negative sign of its 
coefficient. 
Firms with higher debt and capital expenditures have more difficulty in raising cash 
for M&As. Faccio and Masulis (2005) find a negative association between leverage and 
the likelihood of using cash payment. The influence of leverage and capital expenditures 
in the payment method is still ambiguous. We use LEVERAGE and CAP as controls and 
expect negative signs of their coefficients. 
The profitability of the acquiring firm, measured by ROA, along with the valuation 
of the firm by the market, measure by BM, can also affect M&As. Firms that are more 
profitable would be more likely viewed as good firms by the market participants and 
therefore, have lower BM ratio. CEOs of firms with low BM ratio are more likely to use 
shares to pay for the take-over because in this way not only the risks are shared by the 
bidder and the target, but also the firms can save cash and make a better deal (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 2003).  
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Consistent with Benson et al. (2014), we include RVALUE as control.  We also 
include TENDER_OFFER according to Myers and Majluf (1984). Another deal’s 
characteristics, A_PREMIUM is also included as a control.  
In takeovers where more than one bidder is competing for one same target, the 
bidder might want to close the deal fairly quick and hence the bidder would choose cash 
payments over stock offers (Schwert, 1999). Therefore, the NUM_BIDDER is used as a 
control. 
Other firm board characteristics including CEO’s age, tenure, and gender are also 
included as controls. Yim (2013) documents that CEOs are motivated to pursue 
acquisitions and seek higher risk when they are younger. Therefore, a negative sign is 
expected for age. Ali and Zhang (2015) argue that CEOs try to influence the market’s 
perception of their ability in a positive way when the market is more fluctuating and when 
they are younger. Adhikari et al. (2015) find that older CEOs are perceived as more reliable 
and their compensations are already higher on average compared to younger CEOs. Higher 
years of service in the company may motivate CEOs to take less-risky method of payment 
in M&As since their hard-work has already been perceived by the board. Hence, we expect 
a negative sign of tenure. Levi et al. (2014) state that female directors are more likely to be 
risk-averts and are less likely to make acquisitions. Hence, we expect a negative sign of 
the coefficient of female. 
3.2.3 Vega and CAR 
As suggested by the literature review, the association between risk taking incentives and 
post-M&A stock return performance is still ambiguous. Market perception of 
diversification effects also determines M&As.  
We use several performance measures to examine the effects of Vega on the firm 
returns after M&As. Using the daily raw holding period returns for the period starting from 
January 1st, 1992 and ending on December 31st, 2013 from the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP), we construct [0, 5] CAR to measure the cumulative abnormal 
return after the announcement day of the takeover.  
To calculate cumulative abnormal returns, we start by estimating the parameters of 
the market model for each firm in the sample using value-weighted market index. Our 
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estimation period for the parameters of the market model is 252 trading days before the 
window. 9  We use a 30 day break between estimation and event windows to avoid 
contaminating the estimation window with information or rumours about the event that 
may have been leaked prior to the event. After estimating the parameter of the market 
model, we estimate the abnormal return for each firm for days from t = 0 to 5. 
We use the same model as in Brick et al. (2012) to construct the daily abnormal 
return. The model is as following: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑎𝑖 − 𝛽𝑖 ∗ 𝑅𝑚,𝑡) , 
ARi,t is the daily abnormal return of firm i at day t after the announcement day of 
the takeover. 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the actual return of firm i at day t after the announcement day of the 
takeover. 𝑎𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖 , and 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 are parameters that are estimated using daily holding period 
return of 252 trading days before the window. We construct the excess returns by using the 
sum of daily abnormal returns over five-day period.  
The regression regarding to CAR is as followed.  
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡+1 = 𝑎 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑉𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝛽3
∗ 𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 ∗ 𝑉𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡 
(3)  
CARt+1 is the cumulative abnormal return in period t+1. The main dependent 
variable would still be  𝑉𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡  . To test the diversification effect, we also include 
Same_Industry that takes 1 for firms made M&As within the same-industry and takes 0 
otherwise. We have included another interactive term Same_Industry*Vegat to test the 
effects of Vega on post-M&As CAR. All other controls are similar to that of equation (1). 
Consistent with our hypothesis, we expect a negative coefficient of 
Same_Industry*Vegat and a positive coefficient of Vegat. Explanations are that risk-taking 
incentives motivate CEOs take additional risk by engaging in same-industry takeovers and 
also paying cash in M&As. This is negatively viewed by the market. However, CEOs may 
                                                          
9 t = -282 to -31  
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also focus on risk-decreasing cross-industry takeover and this diversification effects are 
positively viewed by the market.  
Levi et al. (2015) argue that female directors are positively viewed by the market 
and they can create shareholder value through their influence on M&As. Therefore, we 
expect a positive sign of female. Serfling (2014) find that firms with older CEOs earn lower 
risk-adjusted stock returns. Hence, we expected a negative sign of age. Adhikari et al. 
(2014) find that CEOs with higher tenure are perceived as more trustworthy. A positive 
sign of tenure is expected.  
3.2.4 Vega and cash flow volatility 
To further test the association between Vega and post-M&A firm risk. We test the 
relationship between Vega and post-M&A cash flow volatility. 
Using the quarterly raw cash flow to asset for the period starting from January, 
1987 and ending in December, 2014 from COMPUSTAT, we calculate standard deviation 
of cash flow to asset as a proxy of cash flow volatility to examine the effects of Vega on 
firm’s risk after M&As. Defination of cash flow to asset is available in table 1. Our 
estimation period is 5 year before and after M&As.  
The regressions on cash flow volatility would be as followed. 
𝐶𝐹𝑉𝑇𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑉𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 ∗
𝑉𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡 +                    𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡  
(4) 
CFVTt is the cash flow volatility in the following five years after M&As. To test 
the difference between same- and cross- industry takeovers. We include Same_Industry 
that takes 1 for firms made M&As within the same-industry and takes 0 otherwise. We also 
include another interactive term Same_Industry*Vegat to test different affects of Vega on 
post-M&As cash flow volatility. The main dependent variable would still be Vegat. All the 
other controls are similar to that of equation (1). Additionally, to control current cash flow 
volatility, we have also included current cash flow volatility as a control variable.  
Consistent with our hypothesis 4, we expect a positive coefficient of Vegat and no 
significance of Same_Industry*Vegat . 
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4. Empirical Results  
4.1 Summary statistics 
We report the summary statistics of major dependent and independent variables in Table 
2. The table shows us that the mean values of Vega and Delta of total sample are $120,980 
and $566,240 respectively. Because of the great degree of incentives generated by 
executive stock options, CEOs do have the motivation to increase firm value and equity 
return volatility to cumulate their personal wealth. Our averages of Vega and Delta are 
similar to the summary statistics in Coles et al. (2006) and Benson et al. (2014).10 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
We further divide our sample into three groups, Acquirer (Same Industry) for firms 
whoes largest deal of takeover is in that year within the same-industry within the time 
period, Acquirer (Different Industry) for firms whoes largest deal of takeover in that year 
is from different industries within the time period, and Non-acquirer for firms who have 
no take-over actions within the time period. The same-industry acquirers show an average 
Vega of $141,370 and the cross-industry acquirers have an average Vega of $153,960. Both 
of them are significantly higher than the average Vega of NON-acquirer group ($115,660), 
indicating that firms with higher Vega may be more likely to act as a bidder and take over 
potential target firms. The average Delta of Acquirer group ($682,170 and 703,660 for 
same-industry and cross-industry respectively) is also significantly higher than the average 
Delta of NON-acquirer group ($541,120), suggesting that firms with higher Delta may also 
be more likely to take over other firms.  
We see a higher average size in Acquirer (Different Industry) and a lower average 
size in Acquirer (Same Industry) compared to Non-acquirer. Higher sales growth rate of 
Acquirers group (0.14 and 0.12 for same-industry and cross-industry respectively), 
comparing with NON-acquirers (0.08), implies that firms with higher sales growth rate in 
general are more likely to be potential acquirers. Leverage, however, plays a negative role 
in showing the potential of bidders. Acquirers process a leverage ratio of 0.16 and 0.18, for 
                                                          
10 Our mean and median are higher than Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006), but lower than Benson, Park, and 
Davidson III (2014) because of the different sample and time period chosen.  
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same-industry and cross-industry respectively, which is lower than or equal to that of Non-
acquirers who have an average 0.18 leverage ratio. The explanation is that firms with higher 
leverage generally have higher debt, and they choose to not get involved in riskier projects 
such as M&As. We find a higher average capital expenditure rate in Acquirer (Same 
Industry) and a lower average capital expenditure rate in Acquirer (Same Industry) 
compared to Non-acquirer. Additionally, we find that higher book-to-market ratio is also 
associated with lower likelihood of being potential bidders. Higher ROA, on contrary, is 
associated with higher likelihood of taking over, which indicates that firms with higher 
profitability are more commonly to take over potential targets. Acquirer group (Same 
Industry and Different Industry) also shows a lower age, a higher tenure, and a lower 
average female CEOs compared to Non-acquirer.  
4.2 Correlations of variables 
The correlation matrix between dependent and independent variables is presented in table 
3. We find that most of dependent and independent variables are correlated with each other. 
However, the magnitude of correlation between most variables is quite small. We also 
notice that high correlation exists between Vega and Delta, which is 0.453. To avoid multi-
collinearity concerns, we include regression models both with and without Delta and the 
results still hold. LOG_SALES and SIZE are also highly correlated with each other and it 
is economically significant. We reported the main results using LOG_ASSET (SIZE in the 
outputs) as a control of firm size.11  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
4.3 Vega and M&A decisions 
Table 4 shows the results of testing the effect of Vega on the likelihood of taking over and 
the likelihood of takeover within same industry or within different industry. The first two 
columns are related to the effects of Vega on the likelihood of taking over and the next two 
columns are related to the effects of Vega on the likelihood of same- and cross-industry 
takeovers.  
                                                          
11 We replace LOG_ASSET with LOG_SALES as a robustness test and find consistent and similar results. 
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[Insert Table 4 here]12 
As presented in table 4 (TAKEOVER vs NON-TAKEOVER), the positive and 
significant coefficient 1.891 suggests that there is a positive association between Vega and 
likelihood of taking over. After controlling Delta, we observe that the relation of Vega on 
the likelihood of takeover still holds. Hence, we are able to conclude that higher Vega 
motivates CEOs to pursue investments in M&As. A positive coefficient of 3.355 in model 
I (SAME_INDUSTRY vs CROSS_INDUSTRY) is shown in table 4 and the sign of the 
coefficient still holds after controlling Delta. Our finding suggests that high Vega is 
associated with higher likelihood of same-industry takeover if the firm decides to proceed 
with the M&A. 13 
The coefficients of SIZE in model I and II (TAKEOVER vs NON-TAKEOVER) 
are not significant, but the coefficients of SIZE in model I and II (SAME_INDUSTRY vs 
CROSS_INDUSTRY) are significant and negative, indicating a negative correlation 
between firm size and likelihood of same-industry taking over conditional on takeovers. 
One explanation is that larger firms may tend to get involved in cross-industry M&As to 
diversify the risk, which they cannot achieve in getting involved in same-industry M&As. 
Another explanation is that same-industry deals involving larger firms are more likely to 
attract regulatory scrutiny.  
Sales_Growth possesses a positive correlation with likelihood of taking over and 
conditional on takeovers bidder firms with higher sales growth are more likely to carry out 
same-industry takeovers because firms with higher sales growth are more likely to be 
growing companies and to maintain the growth rate, CEOs are more likely to take over 
other firms. LEVERAGE does not play a role in TAKEOVER vs NON-TAKEOVER, but 
the coefficient of leverage is negative in SAME_INDUSTRY vs CROSS_INDUSTRY, 
suggesting that when firms decide to do the takeover, higher leverage is associated with 
lower likelihood of same-industry takeovers. CAP shows a negative correlation with 
                                                          
12 We also include LOG_AGE, LOG_TENURE, and FEMALE in our robustness tests and find similar results. 
13 We have also tested the net effect of Vega on cross-industry takeover and found that higher Vega is 
associated with higher likelihood of cross-industry takeover. 
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likelihood of taking over, which indicates that firms with higher capital expenditure rate 
are more concerned with the budget and risks from the M&As, therefore they are less likely 
to invest in M&As. However, the sign of CAP reverses in SAME_INDUSTRY vs 
CROSS_INDUSTRY is positive, which suggests that higher capital expenditure rate 
motivates firms invest in the same industry takeovers. Consistent with Shleifer and Vishny 
(2003), we find that firms with lower BM ration are more likely to launch acquisitions. But 
BM does not possess significance in SAME_INDUSTRY vs CROSS_INDUSTRY. ROA 
possesses a positive relationship with likelihood of taking over. Firms with higher 
profitability are more likely to carry out M&A projects. However, higher ROA is 
negatively associated with same-industry takeover after the firm decides to launch the 
takeover. One explanation is that same-industry opportunities are not enough to let firms 
maintain its current return and therefore they are more likely to seek opportunities in other 
industries.  
We are able to reject hypothesis 1 based on the above findings and conclude that 
firms with higher risk taking incentives are more likely to carry out takeovers and if they 
do they are more likely to acquire firms from the same industry.14 
4.4 Vega and cash payment 
To further examine the effect of Vega on the CEO’s willingness to take more risks, we use 
logit model to test their relationship between Vega and possibility of 100% cash payment 
in M&As and the results are presented in Table 5. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
The positive and significant coefficient of Vega, 0.945, in model I suggests that one 
standard deviation increase in stock return volatility is associated with e to the power of 
0.94515 the size increase of likelihood of 100% cash payment in M&As. This positive 
correlation indicates that higher Vega would drive CEOs to take more riskiness and 
therefore use cash to pay for the cross-industry take-over. The coefficient of 
                                                          
14 The net effect of Vega on cross-industry takeover is also positive.  
15 In table 5, we reported the relative risk ration instead of odd ratios.  
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Same_Industry*Vegat is not significant, suggesting that higher Vega would also drive 
CEOs to take more risk and therefore use cash to pay for same-industry takeovers.  
The coefficients of SALE_GROWTH in model III to VIII are negative and 
significantly different from zero. A negative relation between CAP and likelihood of 
takeover and a negative relation between LEVERAGE and likelihood of cash payment are 
also documented in table 5. The negative correlation can be explained by that firms who 
have higher capital expenditures and higher leverage are more likely to be short in cash, 
therefore they are less likely to use cash as payment in M&As. ROA shows a positive 
coefficient, which implies that firms with higher profitability are more likely to have 
enough cash and they are more likely to pay cash in M&As. Both R_VALUE and 
A_PREMIUM possess negative relations with Vega. This is because firms may experience 
difficulty to raise that huge amount of cash if the transaction value is too high. Therefore, 
they have to choose other payment methods instead of cash. Tender offers are more likely 
to become cash offers. LOG_TENURE holds a positive coefficient, rejecting our 
expectation. But the coefficient of FEMALE is positive and within our expectation.  
Our findings overall are in favor of the second hypothesis. We are able to conclude 
that firms are more likely to pay cash as Vega increases and there is no significant 
difference of Vega’s effects between same-industry M&As and cross-industry M&As. 
4.5 Vega and post-M&A stock return 
Besides the effects of Vega on the risk taking of CEO’s, we further investigate on the effect 
of Vega on post-M&A stock return performance. Table 6 shows the results.  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
The coefficients of Vegat is positive and significantly different from zero, which 
indicates that Vegat is positively correlated with cumulative abnormal return of cross-
industry take overs in [0, 5] period. The coefficient of 0.0207 percent in model III indicates 
that one standard deviation increase in stock return volatility is associated with 2.07 percent 
increase in CAR for cross-industry takeovers. The coefficient of Same_Industry*Vegat is 
negative but insignificant. It is concluded that the market reacts similarly to same- and 
cross- industry takeover associated with high Vega: market participants welcome cross-
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industry takeovers done by risk-seeking CEO and they also show similar enthusiasm 
towards same-industry takeover done by risk-loving CEOs. This is inconsistent with our 
hypothesis 3: high Vega takeover in the same-industry is not favored by the market. Market 
participants do not differentiate between same-industry takeovers and cross-industry 
takeovers and they consider both as favorable takeovers. Our findings still hold after 
controlling Delta.  
Holding others constant, larger firms will process lower abnormal returns, as we 
can observe from model IV and model V from Table 6. Higher capital expenditure is 
associated with lower cumulative abnormal return, which indicates that the market 
participants react to firms with higher capital expenditure negatively. 
The findings in total reject hypothesis 3 and we conclude that firms will experience 
positive post-M&A CAR for both same-industry M&As and cross-industry M&As. 
4.6 Vega and Post-M&A cash flow volatility 
In addition to the effects of Vega on firm’s post-M&A stock return performance, Table 7 
presents the results of Vega on cash flow volatility after M&As.  
[Insert Table 7 here]16 
The coefficients of Vegat are positive in model III and model IV, which indicates 
that firms who carried out cross-industry take overs will experience positive increase in 
cash flow volatility. The significantly positive coefficient of 0.0231 indicates that one 
standard deviation increase in stock return volatility is associated with 0.0231 increase in 
post-M&A cash flow volatility. The coefficients of Same_Industry*Vegat are positive in 
model III and model IV but not significant. We are able to conclude that a positive 
correlation exists between Vega and post-M&A cash flow volatility for cross-industry 
takeovers and same-industry takeovers.  
The negative coefficient of SIZE suggests that firm’s size is negatively correlated 
with future cash flow volatility, which may be explained by that larger firms have more 
capability in managing their future cash flow volatility. Firms with more growth potentials 
                                                          
16 We also include LOG_AGE, LOG_TENURE, and FEMALE in our robustness tests and find similar results. 
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will have higher cash flow volatility, as indicated by the positive coefficients of 
SALES_GROWTH. This is because firms with more growth potentials are more likely to 
invest in other projects, and they are more likely to experience volatile cash flow after they 
have invested in a giant project, such as M&As. Similar to growth potentials, firms with 
higher capital expenditure rate will also be more likely to experience volatile cash flow 
according to the positive coefficients of leverage. Firms with higher leverage are more 
likely to be firms that are short in cash, they would have lower cash flow volatility. 
Therefore, we are able to see the existence of a negative correlation between LEVERAGE 
and Vega. Firms with higher profitability are better managing cash flows, hence the 
coefficients of ROA are negative in model III and model IV. In regard to the deal size, the 
transaction value plays an important role in determining the post-M&A cash flow volatility. 
Higher transaction value will result in higher RVALUE in our regression and make firm’s 
cash flow more volatile. Hence, the coefficient of RVALUE is positive. All the previous 
findings in this session are consistent after we control the current cash flow volatility. 
The results support hypothesis 4 that firms will experience positive post-M&A cash 
flow volatility for both same-industry M&As and cross-industry takeovers.  
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5. Conclusions 
Previous literature has documented the effects of a CEO’s risk taking incentives on his 
personal wealth. Liu and Mauer (2011) using cash holdings as a proxy for a CEO’s risk-
seeking behavior suggest that Vega is positively correlated with a firm’s cash holdings 
indicating that risk-aversion effect dominates the wealth effect. Cohen et al. (2000) find 
empirical evidence that supports the existence of the wealth effect that incentivizes CEOs 
to increase a firm’s risk to grow his personal wealth.  
In this thesis we present direct evidence of a positive link between a CEO’s Vega 
and the firm’s willingness to assume more risks in regards to M&A activities. Our main 
results still hold after controlling a CEO’s Delta. We find that firms with a higher sales 
growth rate, a lower capital expenditure rate, a lower book to market ratio, and a higher 
ROA rate are more likely to acquire a potential target firm. Firms with a lower size, a higher 
sales growth rate, a lower leverage, a higher capital expenditure rate, and a lower ROA rate 
are also more likely to take over other firms operating within the same industry when the 
firm decides to carry out the takeover plan.  
We also use the 100% cash payment in an M&A deal and find that the likelihood 
of cash payment is positively correlated with a CEO’s Vega in both same-industry 
takeovers and cross-industry takeovers. Firms with a lower sales growth rate, a lower 
capital expenditure rate, a lower levegrae and a higher amount of profitability are more 
likely to pay cash in an M&A deal. When the deal has a higher value relative to the 
acquiring firm’s total assets, a lower acquisition premium and fewer bidders bidding at the 
same time, it is more likely to be funded by cash. A tender offer is more likely to take the 
form of a payment in cash.  
Post-M&A stock performance using [0, 5] abnormal returns in a cross-industry 
acquisition shows a favorable market response when risk taking incentives are higher. The 
market responds favorably when risk taking incentives are higher for same-industry 
acquisitions and cross-industry acquisitions. One explanation for these findings is that 
market participants do not have as much information as bidding firms and therefore, they 
are not able to differentiate the benefits between same-industry and cross-industry 
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takeovers. Using cash flow volatility, our results show that firms experience higher cash 
flow volatility after either same-industry takeover or cross-industry takeover. 
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Table 1 Variable definitions and data sources 
Variable Definition Source 
VEGA 
The change in the value (in thousand dollars) of CEO wealth 
for a 1% change in annualized stock return volatility 
Execucomp and 
CRSP 
DELTA 
The change in the value (in thousand dollars) of CEO wealth 
for a 1% change in stock return 
Execucomp and 
CRSP 
SIZE 
Natural logarithm of total assets. Asset is the total asset denoted 
in million dollars 
Compustat 
LOG_SALES 
Natural logarithm of total sales revenue. Sales is the total sales 
denoted in million dollars 
Compustat 
SALES_GROWTH Sales Growth = Log ( Salest  / Salest_1). Compustat 
LEVERAGE  Total long term debt / Book value of total assets  Compustat 
CAP Capital expenditure / Book value of total assets Compustat 
BM Total common equity / Market value of equity Compustat 
ROA Net Income/ Total Asset Compustat 
A_PREMIUM 
 (highest price paid per share - the target share price four weeks 
prior to the announcement date) / target share price four weeks 
prior to the announcement date.  
SDC 
S_IN_TAKEOVER 
1 for target firm that does not have the same two-digit Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) code as the acquiring firm, 0 
otherwise 
SDC 
S_IN_VEGA S_IN_TAKEOVER * VEGA 
Execucomp and 
SDC 
NUM_BIDDER Number of bidders participated in the takeover deal SDC 
RTVALUE  Transaction value / Acquiring firm’s total assets 
COMPUSTAT 
and SDC 
TENDER_OFFER  1 for tender offers, 0 otherwise SDC 
CFV 
Forward 5-year standard deviation of cash flow to asset. Cash 
flow to asset is calculated as (Income before extraordinary 
items + depreciation - dividends on common and preferred 
stock) / total assets  
 COMPUSTAT 
CFV_CURRENT 
Previous 5-year standard deviation of cash flow to asset. Cash 
flow to asset is calculated as (Income before extraordinary 
items + depreciation - dividends on common and preferred 
stock) / total assets   
COMPUSTAT 
LOG_AGE Natural logarithm of  the CEO's Age Execucomp 
LOG_TENURE 
Natural logarithm of the number of years the CEO has held the 
title of CEO at the firm. Calculated as the difference between 
the year of the observation and the year in which the executive 
became CEO 
Execucomp 
FEMALE 1 for female CEO, 0 otherwise Execucomp 
CASH 
1 for firms that offer 100% of cash to the target firm as 
payment, 0 otherwise 
SDC 
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Table 2 Summary Statistics 
This table presents descriptive statistics for a sample of US acquisitions announced 
between January 1st, 1992 and December 31st, 2013 drawn from the Thomson Financial 
SDC Mergers and Acquisitions Database. Stock price data is from CRSP, accounting data 
is from COMPUSTAT, and the compensation data is from EXECUCOMP. Total sample 
is the full sample and Acquirer (Same Industry) consists of firms that have taken over 
within the same-industry in the time period. Acquirer (Different Industry) consists of firms 
that have taken over within different industries in the time period. Non-acquirer is a group 
of firms that have not taken over within the time period. VEGA is defined as the change in 
the value (in thousand dollars) of CEO wealth for a 0.01 change in annualized stock return 
volatility. While DELTA is the change in the value (in million dollars) of CEO wealth for 
a 0.01 change in stock return. LOG_SALES is Natural logarithm of total sales revenue and 
SALES_GROWTH equals Log (Salest /Salest_1). SIZE is Natural logarithm of total assets. 
LEVERAGE is defined as long term debt to total assets. CAP is defined as capital 
expenditures to total assets. Book to Market or BM is defined as the ratio of total 
ordinary/common equity to total market value of equity. Return-on-assets, ROA, is defined 
as the ratio of net income to total assets. LOG_AGE is Natural logarithm of CEO’s age and 
LOG_TENURE is Natural logarithm of number of years the CEO has held the title of CEO 
at the firm. FEMALE takes 1 for firms with female CEOs. All variables have been 
winsorized at 1st and 99th percentiles of the empirical distribution. 
Table 2 Summary Statistics 
 
Variable 
Total sample 
Acquirer(Same 
Industry) 
Acquirer(Different 
Industry) 
Non-acquirer 
N 
Mean Std Min Median Max Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std 
VEGA 120.98 195.54 0.14 47.01 1155.73 141.37 216.13 153.96 229.16 115.66 189.18 23667 
DELTA 566.24 1188.73 3.67 189.93 8513.36 682.17 1318.38 703.66 1373.58 541.12 1153.17 23618 
LOG_SALES 7.24 1.57 3.85 7.14 11.20 7.00 1.55 7.43 1.68 7.25 1.55 23667 
SALES_GROWTH 0.09 0.20 -0.53 0.08 0.84 0.14 0.21 0.12 0.21 0.08 0.20 23198 
SIZE 7.47 1.67 4.15 7.34 11.98 7.34 1.63 7.65 1.69 7.46 1.67 23667 
LEVERAGE 0.18 0.16 0.00 0.16 0.62 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.15 0.18 0.16 23588 
CAP 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.29 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 23667 
BM 0.53 0.38 0.05 0.44 2.23 0.45 0.30 0.45 0.29 0.54 0.39 23663 
ROA 0.05 0.08 -0.31 0.05 0.25 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.08 23667 
LOG_AGE 3.95 0.14 3.58 3.97 4.28 3.94 0.15 3.94 0.14 3.96 0.14 15096 
LOG_TENURE 2.24 0.77 0.00 2.48 3.22 2.25 0.71 2.25 0.72 2.24 0.78 20983 
FEMALE 0.06 0.24 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.05 0.23 0.05 0.24 0.06 0.24 23667 
3
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Table 3 Correlation coefficients among variables 
The table presents correlation coefficients among all the variables of the sample of US 
acquisitions announced between January 1st, 1992 and December 31st, 2013 drawn from 
the Thomson Financial SDC Mergers and Acquisitions Database. Stock price data is from 
CRSP, accounting data is from COMPUSTAT, and the compensation data is from 
EXECUCOMP. D_TAKEOVER takes 1 if the firm has taken over other firms. VEGA is 
defined as the change in the value (in thousand dollars) of CEO wealth for a 0.01 change 
in annualized stock return volatility. While DELTA is the change in the value (in million 
dollars) of CEO wealth for a 0.01 change in stock return LOG_SALES is Natural logarithm 
of total sales revenue and SALES_GROWTH equals Log (Salest /Salest_1). SIZE is Natural 
logarithm of total assets. LEVERAGE is defined as long term debt to total assets. CAP is 
defined as capital expenditures to total assets. Book to Market or BM is defined as the ratio 
of total ordinary/common equity to total market value of equity. Return-on-assets, ROA, is 
defined as the ratio of net income to total assets. LOG_AGE is Natural logarithm of CEO’s 
age and LOG_TENURE is Natural logarithm of number of years the CEO has held the title 
of CEO at the firm. FEMALE takes 1 for firms with female CEOs. ***, **, * indicate 
statistical significance level at the 0.01, 0.05, anssd 0.10, respectively. 
Table 3 Correlation coefficients among variables 
 
  D_TAKEOVER VEGA DELTA LOG_SALES SALES_GROWTH SIZE LEVERAGE CAP BM ROA AGE FEMALE 
VEGA 0.0646***            
DELTA 0.0397*** 0.453***           
LOG_SALES 0.0175** 0.506*** 0.266***          
SALES_GROWTH 0.0836*** 0.00428 0.115*** -0.0622***         
SIZE 0.0311*** 0.504*** 0.252*** 0.846*** -0.0997***        
LEVERAGE 
0.00470 0.0327*** -0.0219** 0.185*** -0.0320*** 0.233***       
CAP -0.0557*** 
-
0.0542*** 
0.0391*** -0.00613 0.123*** -0.110*** 0.0611***      
BM -0.0801*** -0.174*** -0.187*** -0.0342*** -0.243*** 0.0818*** 0.0207** 
-
0.120*** 
    
ROA 0.0598*** 0.138*** 0.151*** 0.125*** 0.266*** 0.00865 -0.178*** 0.124*** -0.429***    
LOG_AGE -0.0234*** 0.0484*** 0.0327*** 0.141*** -0.0617*** 0.139*** 0.0339*** -0.0113 0.0248*** 0.0190**   
LOG_TENURE 0.000166 0.0713*** 0.0412*** 0.0287*** -0.0618*** 0.0901*** -0.00358 
-
0.106*** 
0.0780*** 
-
0.0288*** 
-
0.0284*** 
 
FEMALE -0.00697 0.00887 -0.00284 -0.00943 -0.0137 -0.0170* -0.0110 -0.00737 0.0144 0.0112 -0.110*** 0.0867*** 
3
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Table 4: Multinomial Logit regression-likelihood of taking over 
The table reports the results of multinominal logit regression estimates of Equation (2). We 
reported relative risk as our coefficient based on non-M&A firms. All other variables are 
defined in Table I. VEGA is defined as the change in the value (in thousand dollars) of CEO 
wealth for a 0.01 change in annualized stock return volatility. While DELTA is the change 
in the value (in million dollars) of CEO wealth for a 0.01 change in stock return. SIZE is 
Natural logarithm of total assets and SALES_GROWTH is natural logarithm of total sales 
divided by previous year’s sales. LEVERAGE is defined as long term debt to total assets. 
CAP is defined as capital expenditures to total assets. Book to Market or BM is defined as 
the ratio of total ordinary/common equity to total market value of equity. Return-on-assets, 
ROA, is defined as the ratio of net income to total assets. ***, **, * indicate statistical 
significance level at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively.  
Table 4: Multinomial Logit regression-likelihood of taking over 
 
Dependent Variable TAKEOVER vs NON_TAKEOVER SAME_INDUSTRY vs CROSS_INDUSTRY 
Independent Variable I II I II 
VEGA 1.891*** 1.867*** 3.355*** 3.352*** 
  (3.16) (3.10) (3.00) (2.99) 
SIZE 0.0138 0.00838 -0.0709** -0.0711** 
  (0.96) (0.56) (-2.55) (-2.47) 
SALES_GROWTH 1.090*** 1.075*** 0.413** 0.412** 
  (10.19) (9.98) (2.05) (2.04) 
LEVERAGE 0.0781 0.0984 -0.870*** -0.869*** 
  (0.53) (0.67) (-3.16) (-3.14) 
CAP -2.200*** -2.207*** 6.301*** 6.301*** 
  (-5.13) (-5.14) (7.60) (7.59) 
BM -0.541*** -0.527*** 0.116 0.117 
  (-7.57) (-7.30) (0.80) (0.80) 
ROA 1.140*** 1.126*** -2.452*** -2.453*** 
  (3.60) (3.55) (-3.92) (-3.92) 
DELTA   0.0194   0.00104 
    (0.93)   (0.03) 
_cons -1.603*** -1.584*** 0.218 0.218 
  (-13.92) (-13.63) (0.97) (0.96) 
Year and Industry Effect YES YES YES YES 
N 23068 23068 3808 3808 
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Table 5: Logit regression - cash payment  
The table reports the results of Logit regression estimates of Equation (4). The dependent 
variable is Logit (cash payment). All other variables are defined in Table I. VEGA is defined 
as the change in the value (in thousand dollars) of CEO wealth for a 0.01 change in 
annualized stock return volatility. While DELTA is the change in the value (in million 
dollars) of CEO wealth for a 0.01 change in stock return. SIZE is Natural logarithm of total 
assets and SALES_GROWTH is natural logarithm of total sales divided by previous year’s 
sales. LEVERAGE is defined as long term debt to total assets. CAP is defined as capital 
expenditures to total assets. Book to Market or BM is defined as the ratio of total 
ordinary/common equity to total market value of equity. Return-on-assets, ROA, is defined 
as the ratio of net income to total assets. A_PREMIUM = (highest price paid per share - the 
target share price four weeks prior to the announcement date) / target share price four weeks 
prior to the announcement date. RTVALUE = Transaction value / Acquirer’s total assets. 
NUMBER_BIDDER is the number of bidders during the whole process. TENDER_OFFER 
equals 1 for tender offers and 0 for others. S_IN_TAKEOVER equals 1 for target firm that 
does not have the same two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code as the 
acquiring firm and 0 for others. S_IN_VEGA = VEGA* S_IN_TAKEOVER. LOG_AGE is 
Natural logarithm of CEO’s age and LOG_TENURE is Natural logarithm of number of 
years the CEO has held the title of CEO at the firm. FEMALE takes 1 for firms with female 
CEOs. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance level at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, 
respectively 
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Table 5: Logit regression - cash payment  
 
Dependent Variable LOGIT_CASH 
Independent Variable I II III IV V VI VII VIII 
VEGA 0.945*** 0.892*** 0.673*** 0.570** 0.723*** 0.620** 0.654** 0.566* 
 (4.80) (4.17) (2.95) (2.38) (3.10) (2.53) (2.19) (1.82) 
S_IN_TAKEOVER -0.0110 -0.0111 0.0667 0.0677 0.116 0.117 -0.0285 -0.0282 
 (-0.14) (-0.14) (0.81) (0.82) (1.38) (1.38) (-0.25) (-0.25) 
S_IN_VEGA -0.228 -0.229 -0.360 -0.363 -0.333 -0.333 -0.0452 -0.0440 
 (-0.78) (-0.78) (-1.21) (-1.22) (-1.08) (-1.08) (-0.11) (-0.11) 
DELTA  0.0180  0.0412  0.0412  0.0411 
  (0.65)  (1.41)  (1.37)  (1.02) 
SIZE   0.0392 0.0356 -0.00703 -0.0110 -0.0369 -0.0413 
   (1.53) (1.38) (-0.25) (-0.39) (-0.97) (-1.08) 
SALES_GROWTH   -0.917*** -0.952*** -0.802*** -0.834*** -0.942*** -0.977*** 
   (-5.20) (-5.34) (-4.44) (-4.57) (-3.78) (-3.88) 
LEVERAGE   -0.756*** -0.730*** -0.704*** -0.680*** -0.852*** -0.828*** 
   (-3.21) (-3.10) (-2.93) (-2.83) (-2.79) (-2.70) 
CAP   -3.459*** -3.509*** -3.714*** -3.766*** -1.939* -2.041* 
   (-4.63) (-4.69) (-4.85) (-4.91) (-1.83) (-1.92) 
BM   -0.0771 -0.0548 -0.0934 -0.0713 -0.212 -0.189 
   (-0.59) (-0.42) (-0.71) (-0.54) (-1.25) (-1.10) 
ROA   1.661*** 1.660*** 1.881*** 1.872*** 1.131 1.141 
   (3.02) (3.01) (3.33) (3.31) (1.53) (1.54) 
A_PREMIUM     -0.00956** -0.00943** -0.0118* -0.0118* 
     (-2.04) (-2.02) (-1.84) (-1.84) 
RTVALUE     -1.167*** -1.166*** -1.059*** -1.055*** 
     (-6.54) (-6.54) (-4.18) (-4.17) 
NUM_BIDDER     -0.829** -0.823** -0.758 -0.754 
     (-2.19) (-2.17) (-1.47) (-1.45) 
TENDER_OFFER     1.536*** 1.537*** 1.743*** 1.743*** 
     (9.18) (9.19) (6.93) (6.93) 
LOG_AGE       -0.283 -0.267 
       (-0.87) (-0.82) 
LOG_TENURE       0.235*** 0.234*** 
       (3.42) (3.41) 
FEMALE       -0.401* -0.399* 
       (-1.95) (-1.94) 
_cons -0.570*** -0.574*** -0.507** -0.500** 0.745* 0.748* 1.643 1.588 
 (-10.36) (-10.36) (-2.49) (-2.46) (1.71) (1.72) (1.20) (1.16) 
N 3893 3893 3808 3808 3808 3808 2121 2121 
Year and Industry 
Effect 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Pseudo-R-squared  0.0067  0.0068  0.0218  0.0222  0.0535 0.0539   0.0527  0.0530 
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Table 6: Ordinary least square (OLS) regression - CAR (0,5)  
The table reports the results of OLS regression estimates of five-day effect of Vega on 
CAR. The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return. VEGA is defined as the 
change in the value (in thousand dollars) of CEO wealth for a 0.01 change in annualized 
stock return volatility. While DELTA is the change in the value (in million dollars) of CEO 
wealth for a 0.01 change in stock return. SIZE is Natural logarithm of total assets and 
SALES_GROWTH equals Log (Salest /Salest_1). LEVERAGE is defined as long term debt 
to total assets. CAP is defined as capital expenditures to total assets. Book to Market or BM 
is defined as the ratio of total ordinary/common equity to total market value of equity. 
Return-on-assets, ROA, is defined as the ratio of net income to total assets. A_PREMIUM 
= (highest price paid per share - the target share price four weeks prior to the announcement 
date) / target share price four weeks prior to the announcement date. RTVALUE = 
Transaction value / Acquirer’s total assets. NUMBER_BIDDER is the number of bidders 
during the whole process. TENDER_OFFER equals 1 for tender offers and 0 for others. 
S_IN_TAKEOVER equals 1 for target firm that does not have the same two-digit Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) code as the acquiring firm and 0 for others. S_IN_VEGA = 
VEGA* S_IN_TAKEOVER. LOG_AGE is Natural logarithm of CEO’s age and 
LOG_TENURE is Natural logarithm of number of years the CEO has held the title of CEO 
at the firm. FEMALE takes 1 for firms with female CEOs. ***, **, * indicate statistical 
significance level at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively.  
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Table 6: Ordinary least square (OLS) regression - CAR (0,5) 
Dependent Variable CAR[0,5] 
Independent Variable I II III IV V VI VII VIII 
VEGA 0.0160** 0.0131* 0.0207** 0.0173** 0.0213** 0.0179** 0.0305*** 0.0320*** 
 (2.23) (1.70) (2.45) (1.98) (2.51) (2.04) (2.87) (2.94) 
S_IN_TAKEOVER 0.000829 0.000863 0.00146 0.00156 0.00146 0.00156 0.00646 0.00641 
 (0.28) (0.29) (0.48) (0.52) (0.48) (0.52) (1.61) (1.59) 
S_IN_VEGA -0.00974 -0.0103 -0.0106 -0.0114 -0.0110 -0.0119 -0.0220 -0.0215 
 (-0.89) (-0.94) (-0.96) (-1.04) (-1.00) (-1.08) (-1.55) (-1.52) 
DELTA  0.00110  0.00159  0.00160  -0.000950 
  (1.07)  (1.49)  (1.50)  (-0.64) 
SIZE   -0.00141 -0.00156* -0.00185* -0.00201** -0.00218 -0.00208 
   (-1.50) (-1.66) (-1.82) (-1.97) (-1.62) (-1.53) 
SALES_GROWTH   -0.00969 -0.0108* -0.00986 -0.0110* -0.0129 -0.0121 
   (-1.55) (-1.71) (-1.57) (-1.73) (-1.48) (-1.38) 
LEVERAGE   0.00403 0.00489 0.00449 0.00536 0.000309 -0.000123 
   (0.47) (0.57) (0.53) (0.63) (0.03) (-0.01) 
CAP   -0.0617** -0.0634** -0.0617** -0.0633** -0.0570 -0.0550 
   (-2.48) (-2.54) (-2.47) (-2.54) (-1.61) (-1.55) 
BM   -0.00552 -0.00473 -0.00565 -0.00486 -0.00580 -0.00627 
   (-1.21) (-1.03) (-1.23) (-1.05) (-0.98) (-1.05) 
ROA   -0.0216 -0.0224 -0.0199 -0.0207 -0.0407 -0.0406 
   (-1.13) (-1.17) (-1.03) (-1.07) (-1.60) (-1.59) 
A_PREMIUM     0.000201 0.000202 0.000223 0.000224 
     (1.30) (1.32) (1.11) (1.11) 
RTVALUE     -0.00463 -0.00462 -0.0137* -0.0138* 
     (-0.94) (-0.93) (-1.89) (-1.90) 
NUM_BIDDER     -0.000775 -0.000394 -0.00147 -0.00156 
     (-0.07) (-0.03) (-0.10) (-0.11) 
TENDER_OFFER     -0.00627 -0.00630 -0.00828 -0.00822 
     (-1.12) (-1.12) (-1.08) (-1.07) 
LOG_AGE       -0.0172 -0.0173 
       (-1.48) (-1.49) 
LOG_TENURE       -0.00266 -0.00268 
       (-1.10) (-1.11) 
FEMALE       0.00817 0.00825 
       (1.13) (1.14) 
_cons -0.000530 -0.000835 0.0167** 0.0170** 0.0211 0.0210 0.0988** 0.0990** 
 (-0.26) (-0.41) (2.26) (2.31) (1.55) (1.55) (2.06) (2.06) 
N 3018 3018 2961 2961 2961 2961 1672 1672 
Year and Industry 
Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted-R-squared  0.0009  0.0009 0.0032   0.0036  0.0028  0.0032 0.0079  0.0075  
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Table 7: Ordinary least square (OLS) regression - CFV (Cash flow volatility)  
The table reports the results of OLS regression estimates of Vega on CFV. The dependent 
variable is the cash flow volatility. VEGA is defined as the change in the value (in thousand 
dollars) of CEO wealth for a 0.01 change in annualized stock return volatility. While 
DELTA is the change in the value (in million dollars) of CEO wealth for a 0.01 change in 
stock return. SIZE is Natural logarithm of total assets and SALES_GROWTH equals Log 
(Salest /Salest_1). LEVERAGE is defined as long term debt to total assets. CAP is defined 
as capital expenditures to total assets. Book to Market or BM is defined as the ratio of total 
ordinary/common equity to total market value of equity. Return-on-assets, ROA is defined 
as the ratio of net income to total assets. A_PREMIUM = (highest price paid per share - the 
target share price four weeks prior to the announcement date) / target share price four weeks 
prior to the announcement date. RTVALUE = Transaction value / Acquirer’s total assets. 
NUMBER_BIDDER is the number of bidders. TENDER_OFFER equals 1 for tender offers 
and 0 for others. S_IN_TAKEOVER equals 1 for target firm that does not have the same 
two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code as the acquiring firm and 0 for 
others. S_IN_VEGA = VEGA* S_IN_TAKEOVER. CFV_CURRENT is defined as current 
cash flow volatility. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance level at the 0.01, 0.05, and 
0.10, respectively.  
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Table 7: Ordinary least square (OLS) regression - CFV (Cash flow volatility) 
 
Dependent Variable CASH_FLOW_VOLATILITY 
Independent 
Variable 
I II III IV V VI 
VEGA 0.00272 -0.00339 0.0231*** 0.0189** 0.0230*** 0.0185** 
 (0.40) (-0.46) (3.27) (2.57) (3.26) (2.52) 
S_IN_TAKEOVER 0.00778** 0.00795*** -0.000829 -0.000707 -0.00146 -0.00134 
 (2.55) (2.61) (-0.30) (-0.25) (-0.52) (-0.48) 
S_IN_VEGA 0.00000813 0.00000763 0.0000154 0.0000151 0.0000148 0.0000145 
 (0.77) (0.73) (1.62) (1.59) (1.56) (1.53) 
DELTA  0.00219**  0.00191**  0.00203** 
  (2.20)  (2.07)  (2.21) 
SIZE   -0.00424*** -0.00446*** -0.00366*** -0.00391*** 
   (-4.79) (-5.01) (-3.84) (-4.08) 
SALES_GROWTH   0.0395*** 0.0380*** 0.0379*** 0.0363*** 
   (6.37) (6.09) (6.13) (5.84) 
LEVERAGE   -0.0424*** -0.0415*** -0.0416*** -0.0406*** 
   (-5.07) (-4.96) (-4.99) (-4.86) 
CAP   0.0799*** 0.0793*** 0.0792*** 0.0786*** 
   (3.45) (3.42) (3.43) (3.40) 
BM   -0.00574 -0.00477 -0.00468 -0.00363 
   (-1.28) (-1.06) (-1.05) (-0.81) 
ROA   -0.131*** -0.132*** -0.135*** -0.136*** 
   (-7.07) (-7.12) (-7.32) (-7.38) 
CFV_CURRENT   0.288*** 0.289*** 0.288*** 0.288*** 
   (13.79) (13.81) (13.82) (13.85) 
A_PREMIUM     0.0000479 0.0000576 
     (0.35) (0.42) 
RTVALUE     0.0192*** 0.0193*** 
     (3.87) (3.88) 
NUM_BIDDER     -0.0168 -0.0168 
     (-1.63) (-1.63) 
TENDER_OFFER     0.00227 0.00243 
     (0.48) (0.52) 
_cons 0.0430*** 0.0423*** 0.0707*** 0.0713*** 0.0802*** 0.0809*** 
 (20.61) (20.06) (9.41) (9.48) (6.28) (6.34) 
N 2071 2071 2061 2061 2061 2061 
Year and Industry 
Effect 
YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted-R-squared  0.0058  0.0076  0.1964  0.1977  0.2091  0.2110 
 
